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Marine and coastal activities are closely interrelated, and conflicts among different
sectors can undermine management and conservation objectives. Governance systems
for fisheries, power generation, irrigation, aquaculture, marine biodiversity conservation,
and other coastal and maritime activities are typically organized to manage conflicts
within sectors, rather than across them. Based on the discussions around eight case
studies presented at a workshop held in Brest in June 2019, this paper explores
institutional approaches to move beyond managing conflicts within a sector. We primarily
focus on cases where the groups and sectors involved are heterogeneous in terms
of: the jurisdiction they fall under; their objectives; and the way they value ecosystem
services. The paper first presents a synthesis of frameworks for understanding
and managing cross-sectoral governance conflicts, drawing from social and natural
sciences. We highlight commonalities but also conceptual differences across disciplines
to address these issues. We then propose a novel analytical framework which we used
to evaluate the eight case studies. Based on the main lessons learned from case studies,
we then discuss the feasibility and key determinants of stakeholder collaboration as
well as compensation and incentive schemes. The discussion concludes with future
research needs to support policy development and inform integrated institutional
regimes that consider the diversity of stakeholder interests and the potential benefits
of cross-sectoral coordination.
Keywords: trade-offs, ecosystem management, ecosystem services, cross-sectoral coordination, marine
governance, multi-jurisdictional conflicts, institutions, environmental policy
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INTRODUCTION
Human activities can have severe negative impacts on marine
and coastal ecosystems, leading to loss of biodiversity and
degradation of ecosystem services (Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment [MEA], 2005). Competing uses by multiple sectors
of interconnected ecosystem components that span multiple
jurisdictional boundaries and ecological structures generate
cross-sectoral externalities (i.e., side effects on other parties) that
can impede attainment of conservation objectives (Rice, 2011).
Governance systems for fisheries, power generation, irrigation,
aquaculture, marine biodiversity conservation, and other coastal
and maritime activities are generally organized to manage
conflicts within sectors, but not across sectors (Crowder et al.,
2006; Stephenson et al., 2019). Cross-sectoral conflicts typically
involve heterogeneous stakeholder groups with different value
systems, conflicting aims and views of the management problem,
different objectives or priorities, different knowledge bases, and
disagreement regarding the allocation of the costs and benefits
associated with proposed solutions (Adams et al., 2003; Crowder
et al., 2006; Redpath et al., 2013). These conflicts1 are often
society-wide problems, and therefore, the goal of governance
regimes addressing them cannot focus solely on a particular
group of resource users. Rather, solutions need to mitigate
cross-sectoral externalities2, involving both use and non-use
values, while addressing environmental objectives. In addition,
these governance conflicts are not necessarily limited to spatial
conflicts, but can relate to tradeoffs and fundamentally different
perceptions of resource values among diverse user groups.
Stephenson et al. (2019) identified the main deficiencies often
encountered in sector-based governance systems when they face
cross-sectoral conflicts: (1) management of diverse, interacting
sectors falls under the jurisdiction of different authorities using
different approaches and concepts; (2) diverse sectors have
different objectives and values, and management fails to account
for the full range of ecological, economic, social, and institutional
dimensions that are essential for formulating successful resource
management strategies; (3) explicitly identified and agreed
upon objectives are lacking, which leads to the absence of
evaluation of tradeoffs (or potential synergies), among objectives
and across sectors, and of cumulative effects of all interacting
activities, and a lack of mechanisms in place to facilitate
or implement cross-sectoral coordination. Understanding how
cross-jurisdictional governance systems may emerge from such
situations is important in order to durably address these conflicts
(Rice, 2011).
The paper discusses the results of a workshop on marine and
coastal governance conflicts at the interface of multiple sectors
1With regards to the categorization of conflict intensity, with a gradient from
verbal disagreements to military acts as defined in Spijkers et al. (2018), the
conflicts we focus on are typically those of lower intensity, i.e., non-violent
phenomena such as verbal discords or legal proceedings resulting from differing
interests.
2This paper is primarily focused on addressing negative externalities. However,
in general, externalities can be either positive (e.g., fishing vessels switching from
active to passive fishing gear lower their greenhouse gas emissions) or negative
(e.g., building a dam impedes fish passage).
and jurisdictions. The workshop, held in Brest France in 2019,
brought together a group of 20 scholars from different disciplines
to evaluate what environmental and societal factors lead to
such governance conflicts and to identify policy alternatives that
can better align management and stakeholders incentives to
provide lasting resolution of the conflicts. Workshop participants
reviewed eight case studies covering different types of cross-
sectoral conflicting interactions including conflicts between
fisheries and terrestrial human activities, and conflicts between
fisheries and marine mammal conservation. Frameworks for
evaluating and solving these types of governance conflicts were
reviewed and a common analytical framework for comparing the
case studies was developed. The final sessions were focused on
the discussion of common themes across the case studies and
identification of solutions and implementation pathways.
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. We first
review the evaluation and solution frameworks discussed in the
workshop and describe a novel analytical framework developed
in the workshop to facilitate comparison and evaluation of the
cases studies. We then summarize the case studies and apply the
analytical framework to them, tabulating the characteristics of
the conflicts and attempts or proposals to resolve them. Next we
discuss general insights generated by review of the cases as well as
the broader literature that relates to them including: the feasibility
and key determinants of stakeholder collaboration; the debate
over compensation and incentive schemes; and a look ahead
and emerging issues associated with intensifying anthropogenic
pressure on ocean ecosystems. Finally we summarize the main
conclusions of the workshop and identify future research needs.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
In our analysis, we identified two broad types of frameworks
for addressing cross-sectoral conflicts. First, there are evaluative
frameworks that are helpful for understanding why cross-sectoral
conflicts arise and what is stopping the solutions from happening.
Both the Social-Ecological System (SES) framework developed
by Ostrom (2007, 2009) and the transaction cost economics
approaches developed by Coase (1960) and Williamson (1996,
2000) provide some insights into those questions. Notably,
Ostrom and Williamson both won the Nobel Prize in the same
year because their approaches were seen as complementary
(Earl and Potts, 2011), and both build on the work of Coase.
Second, there are frameworks oriented toward solving the
problems (Pikitch et al., 2004; Armitage et al., 2008; Douvere,
2008; Stephenson et al., 2019). While these problem-solving
frameworks need to be integrated with evaluation frameworks,
they adopt a more practical standpoint to design durable
institutions and implement effective collaborative governance.
Problem-solving frameworks and many of the key concepts they
build upon relate to the multi-disciplinary literature inspired
by “Ostrom-type” approaches and to “Coasean-bargaining”
approaches that allow for explicit exchange across sectors to
compensate parties who expect to be made worse off. Below we
present a synthesis of conceptual frameworks for evaluating and
resolving cross-sectoral governance conflicts. We then describe a
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novel analytical framework which draws from these conceptual
frameworks that we apply to the case studies to facilitate a
comparison of the conflicts and solutions (or possible solutions).
Evaluative Frameworks
Evaluative frameworks are focused on understanding what
environmental and societal factors lead to cross-sectoral conflicts
and identifying the key heterogeneities (in stakeholders, the
biophysical system, and institutions) that are barriers to resolving
problems. A meticulous evaluation of the problems to be solved
is a critical step providing information that will make it possible
to generate appropriate solutions.
The SES framework proposed by Ostrom (2007, 2009)
to analyze socio-ecological systems identifies four main
components – the resource system, the resource units, the
actors, and the governance system – that are inextricably linked.
Interactions among these four components are affected by the
broader social, economic, and political context. It is a multi-
level, nested framework that organizes relevant variables for
synthesizing the main features of each subsystem and evaluating
the sustainability of complex systems. Ostrom’s perspective is
an interdisciplinary, descriptive approach that incorporates the
efforts of many scholars that studied the resilience (Berkes et al.,
2000), robustness (Anderies et al., 2004), and vulnerability (Eakin
and Luers, 2006) of SESs.
The SES framework stresses the importance of the rules
governing natural resources and the critical role of stakeholders.
For instance, enforcement mechanisms depend on trust
and reciprocity between stakeholders. The framework also
emphasizes the importance of considering nested institutions. In
a nested environment, there is an overarching set of institutions
within which the subsystem institutions operate. Institutions
operating at the higher level may define how rules can be
changed in the lower level, and subsystems may affect the
broader institutional environment within which they operate.
In settings where issues are geographically contained, access
to the resource is limited, and a time horizon is not too long,
spontaneous, organic solutions derived from “the bottom-
up” by resource users may arise. Nested institutions may
increase transactions costs3 of negotiated or cooperatively
derived solutions because of friction, power imbalance, clashes
of culture, etc.
The literature that follows Ostrom’s work has built upon
her design principles for local-scale common-pool system
(Ostrom, 1990) to address multi-level, multi-layered commons
arrangements, including global commons such as the open
ocean beyond national jurisdictions (Dietz et al., 2003; Stern,
2011; Fleischman et al., 2014). As in the classic definition of
common pool resources, two key characteristics of the conflicts
considered in this literature are: (1) excluding other potential
users of the ecosystem is problematic and costly, and (2) the
rivalrous nature of resource use, which decreases availability to
other users. In the more recent literature, there have been many
3Transaction costs are the costs of searching for information, bargaining, planning,
policing, and enforcement associated with implementing new institutional
arrangements.
applications of the SES framework to understanding conflicts
in large-scale commons – e.g., Epstein et al. (2014) on the
international governance of Atlantic Bluefin Tuna; Evans et al.
(2014) on the governance of the Great Barrier Reef; Villamayor-
Tomas et al. (2014) on the governance of pollution problems
in the Rhine River in Europe. While this body of work has
addressed the issues of multi-resource access and sharing, the
issue of high transactions costs remains a potential obstacle to
resolving conflicts.
The transaction cost framework developed by Williamson
(1979; 1996; 2000) is useful to determine the source of
friction that prevents one sector from negotiating with others,
and what prevents solutions from emerging. The transaction
cost framework suggests that cooperation is more likely
when the transaction costs for seeking mutually advantageous
policy agreements, bargaining over the distribution of the
costs and benefits of those agreements, and monitoring
and enforcing the resulting policy measures, are lower.
In studies of environmental governance and public policy
using a transaction cost framework, transaction costs are
often considered as a source of inefficiency (e.g., waste of
time, effort in conflict and litigation. . .) to be minimized4.
However, transaction costs may also help explain the choice
of institutional arrangements, as stakeholders and authorities
prefer policies with lower transactions costs. Transaction
costs are heterogeneous across institutional arrangements and
depend on the adequacy of their coordination mechanism
(more or less autonomy, more or less coordination) and the
characteristics of the transactions. Sources of transaction costs
are often non-monetary but they can be observed, which
makes transaction costs theory useful to determine the best
adapted form of organization to address a collective action
problem (Libecap, 1994, 2014). Important factors that increase
the transaction costs of addressing cross-sectoral externalities
and reduce the likelihood of collective action are: scientific
uncertainty regarding mitigation benefits and costs; varying
preferences and perceptions across heterogeneous populations;
asymmetric information5; and anticipation of non-compliance
with agreement rules (Libecap, 2014). Multiple, differing
governance and cost identification frameworks employed by
intersecting agencies, further complicate the management of
cross-sectoral conflicts.
Without collective action to address cross-sectoral common-
pool resource6 externalities or public good7 provisioning
problems, the constraints sectors impose on one another go
4See for example Kuperan et al. (2008) for an application to fisheries management
and Mettepenningen et al. (2011) for an application to agri-environmental
schemes.
5Asymmetry of information relates to situations where parties do not have equal
and transparent knowledge about contributions to the externality, natural system
responses, and compliance.
6A common-pool resource is a resource available to all but which provides
diminished benefits to everyone if an individual consumes it and to which access
can be limited only at high cost. Classic examples of common-pool resources
include fishery resources, irrigation systems, aquifers, forests, pastures, etc.
7A public good is a good available to all and whose use by an individual does not
reduce availability to others. Examples of public goods include knowledge, flood
control systems, lighthouses, etc.
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unaddressed, increasing transaction costs and decreasing the
opportunities for collaboration or agreement. For example, even
if fungible property rights exist within sectors, they are usually
not tradable across sectors, therefore opportunities to bargain
over resource access are stymied. A transaction cost framework
is useful to empirically analyze systems and determine why a
particular action was chosen and whether it worked or did not
work. Conflicts often emerge when one party perceives that
they are going to be made worse off and that they will not be
compensated in some manner. In a transaction cost framework,
bargaining among parties typically leads to some compensation
for those who are going to be made worse off (see Coasean-
bargaining approach described below). But this is typically not
easily achieved in a cross-sectoral context. Likewise, the game-
theoretic literature on coalitions in fisheries points out that,
even if cooperation among all players is expected to increase
aggregate benefits greatly, there is a substantial incentive for
the largest players to deviate from a cooperative solution unless
side payments between players are feasible (Arnason et al., 2000;
Bailey et al., 2010). Moreover, prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979) suggests that losses are seen more negatively
than similar volumes of benefits are seen as positive, which
means that the overall volume of benefits (including potential
compensations) may need to increase, if there is redistribution
among stakeholders.
Problem-Solving Frameworks
While evaluative frameworks are essential to define and
characterize the challenges posed by cross-sectoral conflicts, they
do not necessarily identify solutions. The literature that has
evolved from evaluative frameworks includes a body of work
focused on designing effective governance systems and making
multiscale governance institutions durable. Traditional top-
down regulation does not facilitate negotiation or collaboration
among the parties to adjust behavior in a way that would be
effective to address environmental goals (Ostrom, 2005). This
is particularly true when activities are regulated under different
jurisdictions. Top-down regulation typically does not provide
economic incentives toward solving the common-pool resource
problem and is not well suited to address dynamic factors such
as climate change and shifting political agendas. Moreover, top-
down regulations are associated with high transaction costs. In
what follows, we consider two complementary problem solving-
oriented approaches which emerge from the literature above,
which we label “Ostrom-type” and “Coasean bargaining,” and
then proceed to summarize key considerations in problem-
solving frameworks. These approaches are not mutually exclusive
but differ in their emphasis on the tools used to resolve
the conflicts – e.g., collaborative governance and bottom-up
development of use rules (Ostrom) vs. bargaining and exchange
and a focus on reducing transactions costs (Coase).
Ostrom-Type Approach
An Ostrom-type approach for implementing durable institutions
in SESs relies on eight design principles for collective action
(Ostrom, 1990) and on the many lessons learned from the
variety of cases studied over the years (including Agrawal, 2001;
Berkes, 2009; Cox et al., 2010; Cinner et al., 2013). The
approach begins with communities conceptualizing their world
and acknowledging power dynamics (at least implicitly), and
aims to fully account for system dynamics and feedbacks. The
approach includes delegating regulatory authority to user groups
within a setting typically characterized by limited entry, shared
views, long-term commitments, proportionate distribution of
costs and benefits. The resources, the community of resource
users, and collective-choice rules are clearly defined.
In an Ostrom-type approach, the processes of negotiation
and setting up agreements that determine the rights and
responsibilities of the involved parties are intended to reduce
conflicts. The reduction of conflicts is important to ensure
that individuals are willing to invest in creating appropriate
institutions (Ostrom, 1990). When a crisis that imperils the
resource and their users arises, the user groups need to agree
on the problem and on taking action for the collective interest.
This can be a difficult and time consuming task that necessitates
sacrifices by the users (Rowland, 2005). The ability to modify
rules as the need arises is considered essential for being able to
adapt management and ensure resource sustainability (Ostrom,
1990). In cross-sectoral conflicts that go beyond simple allocation
of resource use, some governing body or process is likely to
be needed to facilitate and oversee a solution to the conflict,
though it may emerge from the bottom up rather than being
imposed by the state.
Coasean Bargaining Approach
An economic solution to solving resource use conflicts, often
associated with Coase (1960), emphasizes the importance of the
allocation of property rights and the central role of bargaining
between groups of users. Traditional, top-down approaches (e.g.,
“polluter pays” approach) may not be effective when there are
multiple sectors (and multiple parties within sectors), multiple
governing authorities providing regulation and funding, and
multiple political jurisdictions. In such cases, there may not be
a shared view and common objectives for resource use allocation
among users, and an Ostrom-type approach might be impeded
by excessive transaction costs. Collaboration can be improved
by a better comprehension of stakeholder behavior and Coasean
bargaining in the presence of high transaction costs (Coase,
1960). A Coasean approach in which people can expect to have
a claim on long-term benefits structured by a regulatory mandate
and exchange some sort of property rights among sectors does
not necessarily require a shared vision of the problem and
solutions across sectors (Rhoads and Shogren, 2003). Finding a
way to make some sort of exchange across sectors possible could
be the key to reaching a solution where nobody’s welfare is made
worse off (a Pareto improvement) while advancing protection of
an ecosystem or species.
A Coasean, bargaining-based solution could involve exchange
of regulatory benefits, rather than exchange of traditional
property rights or monetary side-payments. Sectors and
government agencies may negotiate the structure of regulatory
mandates such that regulatory obligations/costs are not uniform
across sectors. For example, a sector may agree to take some
action (e.g., make habitat improvements) in exchange for
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a reduction in regulatory requirements (e.g., an increase in
allowable pollutant discharge for the sector). A competing
sector may agree to this arrangement if the expected benefits
to it, from the other sector’s action, are greater than the costs
of the reduced regulatory requirements. Creation of property
rights in some form (e.g., legally or socially supported claims
to streams of benefits over time) can make systems durable
as they enable Coasean bargaining, making the systems more
dynamic and self-adjusting to exogenous shocks as opposed to
top-down regulations.
Coasean, bargaining-based frameworks sometimes suggest
compensating parties for refraining from taking action that
may harm other parties. This type of compensation might be
controversial (see discussion of this issue below). However,
compensation may cost less than alternative options to achieve
environmental goals, especially when there may be a lot of
opposition and high transaction costs.
Combining the Approaches
Both Ostrom-type and Coasean bargaining approaches delegate
more responsibilities to stakeholders than traditional regulatory
approaches. In fisheries, management regimes can involve both
Ostrom and Coasean approaches. Individual transferable quotas
(ITQs), essentially giving fishers a property right over part of
a total allowable catch, are often considered Coasean solutions
(Tresch, 2015; Libecap, 2016). However, in many cases, all
externalities are not resolved by ITQs. For example, even
if fishers were allocated individual rights, they have formed
cooperatives as a way to find a cost-effective solution to deal with
certain environmental problems such as bycatch (Holland, 2018).
Forming a cooperative (which can be considered an Ostrom-
type approach) can dramatically reduce the transaction costs
of coming to a solution and allow implementing a solution in
an effective way. In that case, the two approaches have been
effectively combined to address ecosystem protection issues and
include non-use values (Holland, 2018). However, the majority
of efforts to operationalize these approaches usually display
either one or the other, and rarely both, as demonstrated in the
following case studies.
Operationalizing Problem-Solving Frameworks
Problem-solving frameworks that utilize one or the other of
these approaches to address coastal and marine governance
conflicts include ecosystem-based management (Pikitch et al.,
2004), adaptive co-management (Armitage et al., 2008; Butler
et al., 2015), integrated management (Stephenson et al., 2019),
collaborative governance (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015), marine
spatial planning (Douvere, 2008), and others. These are
somewhat distinct in their operational implementation, but all
tend to consider that the various ocean uses are interconnected
and that they should be managed jointly. Each of these problem-
solving frameworks uses concepts and principles from multiple
approaches described above, and the ultimate goal is to have
durable institutions that are able to sustain human activities and
achieve environmental objectives. Stephenson et al. (2019) list
the following nine key features for the successful implementation
of integrated management of coastal and marine activities:
(1) recognition of the need for integrated management; (2) a
shared vision by stakeholders and decision-makers for integrated
management; (3) appropriate legal and institutional frameworks
for coordinated decision-making; (4) sufficient and effective
processes for stakeholder engagement and participation; (5) a
common and comprehensive set of operational objectives; (6)
explicit consideration of trade-offs and cumulative impacts; (7)
flexibility to adapt to changing conditions; (8) processes for
ongoing review and refinement; and (9) effective resourcing,
capacity, leadership and tools. All of which can be utilized to
examine the extent to which problem-solving frameworks both
achieve resolution of the resource issue and a durable governance
system to address environmental and human objectives.
A Common Framework for Evaluating
Case Studies
Based on the key elements of conflicts and solutions identified
during the workshop, and bridging the different evaluative and
problem-solving frameworks that were assessed, a common
analytical framework was developed and applied to the case
studies. This novel framework (Table 1) is an output of
the workshop and reflects workshop participants’ consensual
perspectives on important elements to consider in evaluating
cross-sectoral conflicts. Table 1 details how the different elements
of the framework relate to the evaluative and problem-solving
frameworks presented above. Brief summaries of case studies
are presented in the next section. The full case studies are
available in Supplementary Material. The subsequent discussion
sections were developed based on the main lessons learned
from case studies and cross-cutting discussions that were held
at the workshop.
CASE STUDY SUMMARIES
Case Study 1: Moray Firth Seal
Management Plan
The Moray Firth in north-east Scotland has Special Areas of
Conservation (SACs) established for three marine protected
species (harbor seal Phoca vitulina, Atlantic salmon Salmo salar,
and bottlenose dolphin Tursiops truncatus). The conflict centers
around the balance between the conservation of harbor seals and
Atlantic salmon − both protected but with one that preys on
the other, although the impact of predation at the population
level was largely unknown due to a lack of objective scientific
information. Consequently, views held by stakeholders about seal
predation were polarized (Butler et al., 2011).
The Scottish Government issued a Conservation Order in
2002 that prohibited the killing of harbor seals, driven by
declining numbers of harbor seals, the potential consequence
of a Phocine Distemper Virus outbreak, and a bounty scheme
whereby District Salmon Fishery Boards (DSFBs) were paying
marksmen for shooting unlimited numbers of seals. With
declining catches of salmon, and the imperative to protect
salmon SACs, a bottom-up process triggered by salmon fishery
stakeholders emerged in 2002 which aimed to balance seal
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TABLE 1 | Common framework for evaluating case studies.
Case study element Evaluation feature Link with evaluative and problem-solving frameworks
Resources and users Define stakeholder participation Highest-tier variables (resource system, resource units, users) in SES
framework (Ostrom, 2009)Define ecosystem services in consideration
Externalities Identify conflict Second-tier variables I4 (conflicts among users), O3 (externalities to other
SESs), and RU4 (economic value) in SES framework (Ostrom, 2009)Define values (monetary and non-monetary) of stakeholder groups
Distributional effects
and power dynamics
Identify benefits of coordination
Identify beneficiaries of coordination
Define political influence (in relation to stakeholder participation)
Second-tier variables I6 (lobbying activites) in SES framework (Ostrom,
2009); Proportionate distribution of costs and benefits in transaction cost
framework (Libecap, 1994)
Coordination
mechanisms
Define existing coordination mechanisms
Define support from central authorities
Second-tier variables GS1 (government organizations) in SES framework
(Ostrom, 2009); Level 3 (governance) and level 4 (resource allocation) in
transaction cost framework (Williamson, 2000)
Shared objectives Define management and stakeholder objectives
Identify shared and conflicting objectives
Key features #2 (shared vision by stakeholders and decision-makers) and
#5 (common and comprehensive set of operational objectives) in
Integrated Management framework (Stephenson et al., 2019)
Evaluative processes Define existing processes for scenario evaluation focused on
trade-offs
Key features #6 (explicit consideration of trade-offs and cumulative
impacts) in Integrated Management framework (Stephenson et al., 2019)
Solutions Identify solutions and their type (top-down, Ostrom-type, Coasean)
Characterize durability of solutions and resilience to external shocks
Ostrom-type and Coasean-bargaining approaches; Key features #7
(flexibility to adapt to changing condition) #8 (processes for ongoing
review and refinement) and #9 (effective resourcing, capacity, leadership
and tools) in Integrated Management framework (Stephenson et al., 2019)
Governance challenges
and opportunities
Identify barriers to possible solutions
Identify opportunities
Transaction costs associated with institutional changes (Williamson, 2000)
and salmon conservation. The DSFBs and Scottish Natural
Heritage, the Sea Mammal Research Unit (SMRU) and the Moray
Firth Partnership (a forum representing local wildlife tourism
operators, conservation groups and marine fishery interests)
collaborated to develop the Moray Firth Seal Management Plan
(MFSMP) to resolve the conflict between seal conservation and
salmon fisheries. The MFSMP allowed for a collective annual
application from the DSFBs to the Scottish Government to shoot
a limited number of individual seals most likely to be impacting
on fisheries in confined Management Areas, away from seal
pupping sites and marine tourism centers (Butler et al., 2008;
Graham et al., 2011).
A number of conditions enabled the successful negotiation
and implementation of the MFSMP (Young et al., 2012).
The first was a local “champion” − a scientist employed
by the Spey DSFB, with a background in wildlife conflict
resolution and salmon management (Young et al., 2016).
His facilitation enabled the integration of all relevant
stakeholders on an equal footing and resulted in the MFSMP
being endorsed by all stakeholders involved. The second
was the involvement of the Scottish Government, which
created a crisis point (in the form of the Conservation
Order), resourced the process of developing the MFSMP,
and endorsed any agreements reached, thereby legitimizing
the outcomes. The last condition, and one that has not been
fully resolved, is the provision of adequate financial and local
institutional support to ensure long-term implementation
of the plan. Although local DSFBs have appointed a staff
member to collate seal-shooting information and to submit
the annual application, this has been insufficient to fund
stakeholder coordination and interaction, and hence knowledge
exchange, learning and innovation has dissipated since the
MFSMP’s early years.
Longitudinal evaluation indicates that relative to 2004
the MFSMP has shifted from community-led adaptive co-
management to government-led and instructive management
(Butler et al., 2015): annual seal shooting license applications
are approved by the Scottish Government but local stakeholder
engagement has declined. The intervention of a new animal
welfare stakeholder in recent years has caused a further crisis
point for the system. This may have the catalytic effect of
restoring collaborative governance, since the original aims of the
MFSMP are being challenged, upsetting the status quo.
Case Study 2: Salmon Management
Institutions in the Columbia River Basin
Many salmonid populations in the Columbia River Basin are
at historically low levels and are listed either as threatened
or endangered under the US Endangered Species Act (ESA).
Major dams, which are used for power production, flood
control, navigation, and irrigation, are impeding upstream
and downstream migration of adult and juvenile salmonids,
respectively, and blocking access to potential spawning habitats.
Dam operators are tasked with optimizing multi-use operations
while assuring economical and reliable power supply to the
public as well as compliance with the ESA. Salmon conservation
is also potentially conflicting with human harvest and with
the protection of marine mammals (pinnipeds and imperiled
southern resident killer whales) that prey on salmon (Chasco
et al., 2017). Because salmon face a multitude of threats whose
impacts are not fully understood, stakeholder groups tend to
point to threats they themselves are not associated with. For
example, fishers and tribes who want more salmon point to
dams and habitat destruction; irrigators, loggers, and other river
users allege overfishing; and all use sectors also blame predation
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by marine mammals and birds, while non-use sectors criticize
impactful human activities.
Hundreds of millions of dollars are spent annually on
salmon habitat restoration (Northwest Power and Conservation
Council [NPCC], 2020). Other conservation actions that have
also been widely implemented include barging of juvenile
salmon, installation of screens and bypass improvements at
dams, managing dam spills and flow operations for fish, wild
stock supplementation via conservation hatcheries, and leasing
water rights to enhance in-stream flow (McKean and Johnson,
2019; Northwest Power and Conservation Council [NPCC],
2020). Despite these efforts, salmon populations remain in peril.
Improved coordination could lead to taking other, potentially
more cost-effective types of action that have not been broadly
implemented, such as breaching major dams, government-
supervised culling of pinniped predators, and eliminating harvest
supplementation hatcheries (McKean and Johnson, 2019).
Implementation of these potential solutions is generally impeded
by competing stakeholder interests and entrenched interests
arising from management institutions (Hanna, 2008). Improved
coordination could also reduce litigation and uncertainty
associated with litigation, which would benefit to stakeholders
involved in ongoing legal battles. The courts play a critical role in
ensuring actions to promote recovery continue but they generally
do not prescribe particular recovery actions.
With potentially less favorable climate-driven environmental
conditions in the future (both in freshwater and ocean
environments), it is unlikely that salmon populations will
meaningfully recover without considerably reducing human
impacts on salmon and their habitats, returning rivers to
more natural states, and addressing predator control issues
(McKean and Johnson, 2019). The fact that externalities occur
across different ecosystem goods (water users impact salmon
production, marine mammal conservation impacts salmon
survival, salmon users impact killer whale conservation which
rely on salmon for prey), biomes (ocean, estuary, rivers),
and across jurisdictional boundaries (multiple States, multiple
sectors, multiple species) is likely to increase the transaction
costs of collective action because of scientific uncertainty
about externality costs, diverging preferences across parties,
information asymmetry, and anticipation of non-compliance. In
addition, the conflicts involve both use and non-use sectors so
that solutions need to consider the important cultural values that
salmon and killer whales hold in the region. This constrains the
range of possible solutions as there is no straightforward way for
use and non-use sectors to bargain to reduce externality losses.
Case Study 3: International Whaling
Commission
The International Whaling Commission (IWC) was established
75 years ago to manage commercial harvesting of whales.
Initial stakeholders were representatives of commercial whaling
operations. Given today’s growing range of threats that far
surpass mortality from direct hunts, the IWC now has a much
broader range of issues and stakeholders (Wright et al., 2016).
The emerging threats to whales are externalities from sectors
that are not part of the regular IWC stakeholder groups:
fishing; underwater drilling and extraction; shipping noise and
emissions, and other ocean pollution (plastics) (Lent, 2015).
These externalities are rarely if ever internalized into production
and consumption decisions, although regulatory processes might
require impact analyses on marine mammals.
Improved coordination can lead to pareto superior exchanges
with losses to impacted stakeholders offset by other stakeholders
willing to pay for the improvements to the marine ecosystem,
such as the ECHO program8 in Vancouver BC. Marine
mammal entanglement in fishing gear can lead to gear losses
and therefore operators share interest in avoiding bycatch.
Ecolabels can incentivize fishery stakeholders to reduce marine
mammal bycatch (Lent and Squires, 2017). Examples include
the Marine Stewardship Council labeling and the US Marine
Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) import rule9. Processes for
coordination must be created and nurtured. For example,
development of marine mammal bycatch guidelines at the FAO
Committee on Fisheries was possible due to support from
key countries, IWC and other intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations, which provided the funding and
the expertise to partner with FAO to get this work agreed and
completed. The IWC engages with the International Maritime
Organization to provide scientific and technical information
geared at reducing shipping vessel speeds, noise, and emissions.
The IWC is slowly developing social media and other
communication efforts in order to increase awareness of its
efforts to constructively address all impediments to recovery
of whale stocks and to demonstrate its ability to implement
a holistic approach to its mandate through cross-institutional,
cross-sectoral cooperation (International Whaling Commission,
2018). It is only through concerted efforts at cross-institutional
collaboration that there can at least be an understanding of the
different stakeholders’ and institutions’ objectives and values. An
important impediment to more integrated management systems
is the lack of complete data and understanding of population-
level impacts for marine mammals. Small-scale coastal gillnet
fisheries collect very little data on whale bycatch and even less
is known about their population-level impacts (Temple et al.,
2018). The Indian Ocean Tuna Commission estimates that 40%
of the harvests under that organization is taken by gillnets, yet
bycatch data collection through logbooks, observers and other
means lags far behind.
Benefits to marine mammals are often non-market in nature
(Wallmo and Lew, 2011), while the costs to the sector imposing
the externalities are monetary and easier to estimate. For
example, the increased costs to fishery operators of using rope-
less gear in a pot fishery are well documented, however generating
an estimate of the benefits of lower rates of marine mammal
injury and mortality is extremely difficult. The IWC provides
unique insights into the challenges facing an international
institution whose ability to adapt over the years to changes in the
8https://www.portvancouver.com/environment/water-land-wildlife/echo-
program/
9https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/foreign/marine-mammal-protection/noaa-
fisheries-establishes-international-marine-mammal-bycatch-criteria-us-imports
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global governance framework and environmental context may be
critical to meeting its objectives.
Case Study 4: Management of Natural
and Reared Salmon Stocks in the Baltic
Sea
There are very strong natural salmon stocks in the northernmost
part of Baltic Sea, and their overall production is around
70% of the total salmon production in the Baltic Sea (ICES,
2020), while it was less than 10% in 1980’s. The successful
management of these stocks has a big impact on the whole Baltic
Sea fishing (Romakkaniemi et al., 2003). The main stakeholder
groups include professional off-shore and coastal fishers, and
recreational river fishers. The tourism industry along the river
valleys is another important player, as it is estimated that the
total value of one landed salmon in river areas is much higher
than in sea fishing, where the value is around 20 − 60 € for a
commercial fisher. Nature conservation organizations have been
active in contributing to the policy to safeguard the stocks.
In the sea, the value of the fishery is linearly linked to
stocks and thereby on catches. However, for river fishing, the
mechanism seems to be that the catch per unit effort must be high
enough to incentivize participation in the fishery during the best
river fishing season (June-August). The conflict with recovering
populations of seals has been suggested by stock assessment
models (Mäntyniemi et al., 2012). Now there seems to be a
balance in the seal stocks and hunting is allowed by applying a
quota, but technically the hunting is very difficult and the quotas
are not taken. There is some evidence that gray seals gather in
the river-mouths at the time when smolts leave the river and the
impact on salmon stocks may be high.
Historically, the reason for poor river catches has always been
claimed to be the off-shore and coastal fisheries, and the poor
coastal catches have been said to be due to the off-shore fishing,
etc. At the time when reared stocks were the majority of mixed
stocks (up to 90 %), overfishing was not an economic risk, but
now state of the stocks is different (ICES, 2020). By improving
the natural recruitment, the current management system has
shown its power. Historically, a key management action was an
establishment of a stepwise opening of coastal fishery from south
to the north in Finnish coastal waters which ensured a certain
proportion of migrating spawning stock to enter the spawning
rivers. This helped both Swedish and Finnish stocks, even though
the political will to do something was entirely based on the
Finnish fisheries minister alone. The same coastal management
system is still applied in Finland and it can be seen as a biomass-
independent management of fishing mortality. In all EU fisheries
management the key objective is to reach maximum sustainable
yield (MSY). In the case of salmon, this means that smolt
production must be about 75% of the maximum (ICES, 2020).
Individual transferable quotas systems have been applied in
many Baltic Sea countries. In Finland, the system was suggested
by scientists a long time ago (Mickwitz and Pruuki, 1993),
and both scientists and nature conservation NGOs demanded
that the trade of the quota should be made possible between
the different fisheries, especially river-based and at-sea fisheries.
However, in the last steps of political decision-making, this option
was removed from a new legislation, most likely to preserve
employment in commercial fisheries.
Case Study 5: Interactions Between
Seals and Commercial Fishing in Ireland
In Ireland, it is illegal to hunt or injure seals up to 12
nautical miles offshore without ministerial permission. Recent
surveys in Ireland show increasing gray seal (Halichoerus
grypus) and harbor seal (Phoca vitulina) populations (Cosgrove
et al., 2016), and both species are considered to be of Least
Concern (low risk of extinction) by the International Union for
Conservation of Nature.
The gray seal is the primary species interacting with
commercial inshore set net fisheries. A 2010 questionnaire to
fishers suggests depredation10 rates of 20 – 30% across gill, tangle
and trammel net fisheries (Cosgrove et al., 2015). Recent research
showed that averages of 18% of Pollack (Pollachius pollachius),
10% of hake (Merluccius merluccius), and 59% of monkfish
(Lophius piscatorius) landings were depredated by seals, and
these proportions have substantially increased since the 1990’s
(Cosgrove et al., 2015). Total loss of landings could be over
50% in both the pollack and hake fisheries, with an estimated
value of €1.7 m, when the fish entirely removed from nets were
taken into account. This has led to a clear conflict in interests
between the fishing industry and conservation sector, particularly
environmental NGOs (Cronin et al., 2016). Responsibility for
seal conservation and seal/fishery interactions also involve two
different government departments. The goods and services
involved are principally the provisioning services from the fishery
(very important in rural west Ireland), and cultural services
(existence value) of the seals. The fishers want seal populations
being controlled. The environmental NGOs want the populations
to continue recovery from their historic lows after hunting was
banned. Those responsible for conservation in the government
aim to comply with national and international legislation, which
broadly stipulates a stable or growing population.
Can improved coordination help here? Probably not.
Legislation prevents the culling of seals, advocated by fisher’s
groups. The environmental NGOs are also concerned about seal
bycatch in the fisheries. The best improvement would be to try to
reduce depredation by the seals. Smart fishing techniques could
help, such as shorter gear deployments, working gear in relation
to tidal currents, and faster hauling speeds (Cosgrove et al.,
2015). Acoustic seal deterrent devices have potential too. Some
coordination to help both sides understand the other’s views
would be useful. In terms of power dynamics, neither party is
particularly powerful politically, and struggles to get their points
of view considered by national authorities.
There are conflicting objectives for fishers and environmental
NGOs. Fishers are mainly concerned by loss of income and
operational difficulties (Cosgrove et al., 2015). The NGOs
promote seal conservation and protection. Thus fishers are
primarily concerned with monetary values, and NGO concerns
are principally non-monetary. There are no processes in
10Depredation is the retrieval of fish from fishing gear by animals.
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place for evaluating tradeoffs and synergies, and cross-sectoral
coordination mechanisms are lacking. An ad hoc group was
established some years ago to bring the parties together, but this
was unofficial and had no direct mandate. It was successful in
the task of getting each side to understand the position of the
others. It ceased to operate in recent years with the loss of some
key members. The current position is not particularly durable or
resilient. The depredation issue emerges periodically in the press
or parliamentary questions but is quickly forgotten. None of the
mitigation solutions have gone beyond the pilot phase. Lack of a
single authority responsible on this subject is also likely an issue.
Case Study 6: Water Supply and Salmon
in California’s Central Valley
The Central Valley of California, on the Pacific coast of the
United States, has long been the setting for conflicts over
the allocation of scarce freshwater resources between irrigated
agriculture and habitat for Chinook salmon (Oncorhynchus
tshawytscha). Farms in the Central Valley produced over $US
50 billion in 2017. Irrigation water is an important constraint
to agricultural production and can induce significant economic
and social impacts during severe or prolonged droughts (Speir
et al., 2015; Lund et al., 2018). The Central Valley is also home
to Chinook salmon, anadromous fish that spend most of their
adult lives in the ocean, then return to their natal rivers to
spawn. Juveniles rear in freshwater, then emigrate to the ocean.
Freshwater habitat degradation has led to long-term declines in
fish populations and an increasingly large body of evidence shows
that instream flow conditions are a primary driver (Michel et al.,
2015; Perry et al., 2018; Michel, 2019; Friedman et al., 2019;
Henderson et al., 2019).
Water supply in the Central Valley is a highly engineered
system managed by multiple federal, state, and local agencies.
Direct management of dams, reservoirs, and canals is done by
the Federal Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) and the California
State Department of Water Resources (DWR). Species protection
is overseen by two federal agencies, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration Fisheries Service (NOAA fisheries)
and the US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), and a state
agency, the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW).
Delivery of water to agricultural users is done by local irrigation
districts. Water supply operations are subject to the ESA because
some Chinook salmon and other fish are listed as endangered.
The ESA requires federal agencies to ensure that actions they
fund, authorize, or carry out are not likely to “jeopardize”
a species or “destroy or adversely modify” critical habitat.
USBR must consult with federal wildlife agencies, which then
produce a “biological opinion” describing how listed species are
affected and prescribing operational rules for minimizing harm
to listed species.
There is a history of institutions that coordinate among
stakeholders and attempt to develop water policy in the basin.
CALFED was a partnership of federal, state, and interest
group organizations created in 1994 after several consecutive
drought years with a mandate to find collaborative solutions
in four areas: water quality, water supply, levee stability, and
ecosystem restoration. However, fish populations and water
quality continued to decline and CALFED dissolved in 2007
(Kallis et al., 2009; Lurie, 2011; Dutterer and Margerum, 2015). By
2013, a new governance body, the Delta Stewardship Council, was
established to facilitate stakeholder involvement and implement
policy. There is some potential for improved coordination
between sectors. For example, rice farmers have coordinated with
state and national wildlife agencies and NGOs to create floodplain
habitat (Katz et al., 2017). However, conflicts often play out in the
form of interest group politics and litigation.
Case Study 7: St. Croix River Alewife
Restoration
The St. Croix River, which forms part of the international
border between Maine, United States and New Brunswick,
Canada, once supported large runs of anadromous alewife
(Alosa pseudoharengus). Alewife migrations were interrupted by
dams that spanned the full river beginning about 1830, and
populations were further impacted negatively by deteriorating
water quality due to logging and industrial development.
Attempts to facilitate recovery of this native species, which was
effectively extirpated from much of its range due to human
activity, have been complicated by different values placed on
ecosystem services (Table 2) and by complex jurisdictions
(Willis, 2009; Barber, 2018).
Prior to 1980, fishways on the four major dams that span the
St. Croix River were either absent or ineffective. Completion of a
new fishway at the lower dam in 1981 resulted in a resurgence
of the alewife population in the St. Croix system, but this
coincided with a drastic decline of smallmouth bass in upper
lakes, which had become the basis for an active sport fishing
guide sector. In response to a strong lobby from bass fishing
guides, the State of Maine enacted emergency legislation to close
fishways on the US side to migrating alewives. The Government
of Canada consistently called for the St. Croix River to be opened
TABLE 2 | Views of major stakeholders regarding St. Croix River alewife
recovery issues.
Major stakeholder/sector Position/issue
Indigenous (Passamaquoddy)
Peoples, Environmental NGOs
Alewives are critical to the ecosystem and as
a food source. Recovery of alewives was
being stalled to protect an introduced species
of commercial (recreational) value
Businesses (paper and power
companies)
The dams of the St. Croix river, while old, are
still valuable in their contributions to industry
and power generation
Government of Canada
(Department of Fisheries and
Oceans)
Alewives are a native species and should be
returned to native habitat
Government of the State of Maine Faced with conflicting objectives of
Passamaquoddy Tribe who want to promote
alewife recovery and bass fishing guides who
have preferred to prevent alewife recovery
Bass fishing guides Perceived a negative interaction between
alewife restoration and bass productivity, so
argued against restoration
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to alewife passage and began trucking alewives upstream (around
the closed dams) to spawn.
Saint Croix activities are governed by State/Province
and Federal United States/Canada departments. There are
many issues (including fisheries, recreation, industry) and
several jurisdictions (including Governments of Canada, New
Brunswick, United States, Maine, the Passamaquoddy people
and communities). There has been no single, agreed governance
structure within which this issue could be resolved. As an
international boundary, the St. Croix has a bi-national Board
under the auspices of the International Joint Commission which
has no direct authority related to alewives, but has provided a
forum for synthesis and cross-boundary discussion aimed at
preventing or reducing transboundary conflict. An ad hoc cross-
jurisdictional group has worked to promote alewife recovery by
dispelling the concern that alewife recovery is detrimental to
bass, getting consistency in management across jurisdictions,
and improving fish passage at dams.
Case Study 8: Depredation by Toothed
Whales in French Antarctic Toothfish
Fishery
Depredation of the very valuable Patagonian toothfish
(Dissostichus eleginoides) by sperm whales (Physeter
macrocephalus) and killer whales (Orcinus orca) is generating
conflicts between the French longline vessels operating in French
Antarctic territories and conservation objectives for marine
mammals (Guinet et al., 2015; Tixier et al., 2015). Depredation
often results in socio-economic impacts, biological impacts
on targeted fishes and on depredating species, but also in
ecosystem impacts. In addition, sperm and killer whales are
iconic protected species that have important non-use value for
environmentalists and the public.
This fishery is the only commercial activity in this area and
is constituted of a concentrated fleet of seven industrial vessels.
At the international level, the main stakeholder involved is the
Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources, which sets conservation measures that determine the
use of marine living resources in the Antarctic, based on the best
available scientific information. The French Government is in
charge of managing the fishery. Stakeholders include scientists,
environmental NGOs, and the fishing industry. Conservation
objectives require minimizing depredation-type interactions by
non-lethal measures, such as implementation of vessel avoidance
strategies and/or development of catch protection systems (Tixier
et al., 2015). Current coordination between stakeholders and
sectors exists and is substantial. Several research programs are
co-funded by the industry, in collaboration with the regional
administration (Terres Australes et Antarctiques Francaises);
depredation is taken into account in toothfish stock assessments;
and the funding provided by the selling of fishing rights related
to toothfish fishing are used, among other things, to support
scientific activities and monitoring of authorized fisheries. Thus,
at least implicitly, there is a cross-sectoral allocation mechanism.
In general, there is a political will to maintain the
coordination among stakeholders. The Marine Stewardship
Council certification scheme of the fishery provides an important
driver for shared objectives and demonstrates that the fishing
industry can be involved in biodiversity preservation (Des Clers
et al., 2018). While coordination is advanced compared to other
fisheries, there is still a lack of knowledge regarding the overall
impact of depredation on the toothfish stock and the associated
marine ecosystem. And although the conservation objectives are
relatively well understood by the fishing industry, it is hard to say
that protecting the whale populations is a shared objective.
To date, the distributional impacts of whale conservation
are rather unknown. The governance system in place could
allow for adaptive co-management, providing rapid feedbacks
on the outcomes of depredation mitigation actions (Guinet
et al., 2015). Proposed solutions to mitigate depredation also
include a possible diversification of target species for the
current toothfish fishery (Tixier et al., 2015). Key aspects to
investigate further – that will help proposing effective solutions
to the depredation issue – include evaluations of the non-
monetary benefits of conservation, the overall ecosystem impact
of depredation, and the sensibility / dependency of the fishing
industry to depredation.
RESULTS − APPLYING THE COMMON
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section, we review a series of eight illustrative case studies
that were evaluated using the analytical framework introduced
in Table 1 to tabulate the key characteristics of the conflicts
and solutions (or potential solutions). The case studies have
been briefly presented in the previous section and additional
descriptions are provided in Supplementary Material. This
common framework aims to characterize the: conflicts (Table 3);
distributional effects and power dynamics (Table 4); coordination
mechanisms (Table 5); stakeholder objectives and processes for
evaluating trade-offs (Table 6); solutions implemented (Table 7);
and, the governance challenges and opportunities (Table 8).
The eight case studies cover different types of cross-sectoral
conflicting interactions, including conflicts between fisheries
and terrestrial human activities, and conflicts between fisheries
and marine mammal conservation (Table 3). In all of these
cases there are conflicts between two or more sectors that are
concerned with different ecosystem services or activities that
create external costs on other sectors. Most conflicts involve
trade-offs between use and non-use values. Several cases involve
conflicts between fisheries and conservation of marine mammals
including cases where marine mammals harm fisheries and
vice versa. Other cases involved activities that compromise
habitat for marine species harming both resources users and
conservation interests. In all of these cases, the conflict goes
beyond allocation of use of a single resource and resolving them
generally requires compromise between stakeholder groups with
divergent interests.
All of the cases identify potential benefits from better
coordination of conflicting activities or mitigation of their
impacts (Table 4). All cases also identify jurisdictional conflicts
and power imbalances that have led to costly litigation or political
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TABLE 3 | Case studies – conflict characterization.
Case study Resources and users Externalities/conflicts
Species involved Sectors involved
(1) Moray Firth Seal
Management Plan
Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar), harbor seals
(Phoca vitulina)
Fisheries, tourism, government,
conservation, NGOs
Salmon conservation vs. protection of predators
(seals) and fisheries
(2) Salmon management
institutions in the Columbia
River Basin
Salmon (Oncorhynchus spp.), killer whales
(Orcinus orca), pinnipeds
Fisheries, hatcheries, dams,
agriculture, habitat restoration,
NGOs, Indian tribes
Salmon conservation vs. dams, protection of
predators, and fisheries
(3) International Whaling
Commission
Whales Whaling, fisheries, offshore drilling,
shipping, whale watching, NGOs
Whale conservation vs. fishing (bycatch), drilling
and extraction, shipping noise and emissions, ship
strikes, ocean pollution, direct takes
(4) Management of Natural
and Reared Salmon stocks
in the Baltic Sea
Salmon (Salmo salar), seals (Halichoerus
grypus)
Fisheries, tourism, hydropower
dams, river water quality, NGOs
Salmon conservation vs. commercial and
recreational transboundary fisheries, slight conflict
with seals
(5) Interactions between
seals and commercial
fishing in Ireland
Gray seals (Halichoerus grypus), monkfish
(Lophius spp.), other demersal fish,
crawfish (Palinurus elephas)
Fisheries, NGOs, conservation
bodies
Seal conservation vs. sustainable fisheries
(6) Water supply and salmon
in California’s Central Valley
Chinook salmon (Oncorhynchus
tshawytscha)
Agriculture, fisheries, habitat
restoration, dams, NGOs
Salmon conservation vs. irrigated agriculture
(7) St. Croix River alewife
restoration
Anadromous alewife (Alosa
pseudoharengus), smallmouth bass
(Micropterus dolomieui)
Hydropower, Businesses (paper
companies, bass fishing guides),
NGOs and Indigenous Peoples
Blocking (native) alewife passage at dams to protect
(introduced) bass productivity for recreational
fishery vs. returning alewife to native habitats
(8) Depredation by toothed
whales in French Antarctic
toothfish fishery
Toothfish (Dissostichus eleginoides), killer
whales (Orcinus orca), sperm whales
(Physeter macrocephalus)
Fisheries, government, NGOs Depredation: whale conservation vs. sustainable
fisheries
TABLE 4 | Case studies – Distributional effects and power dynamics.
Case study Distributional effects and power dynamics
Benefits of coordination Political influence
(1) Moray Firth Seal Management
Plan
Reducing litigation and transaction costs; generating
innovative solutions
Government holds legal leverage over fishery interests; conservation
NGOs have moral ascendancy to give seal conservation priority
(2) Salmon management institutions
in the Columbia River Basin
Implementing more cost-effective recovery action, reducing
litigation
Strong hydropower and agricultural interests vs. tribal interests and
diffuse non-use values; fishery interests favoring hatcheries
(3) International Whaling
Commission
Design and implementation of more tailored and
cost-effective monitoring and mitigation measures
Fishing and processing, oil and mineral extraction, shipping.
(4) Management of Natural and
Reared Salmon stocks in the Baltic
Sea
Improved management of a transboundary resource,
support for science, higher value use of salmon
All management actions re-distribute catches, i.e., they are very
political decisions
(5) Interactions between seals and
commercial fishing in Ireland
Depredation and byctach of seals are likely linked,
suggesting the possibility of benefits for both
Neither side are particularly strong politically, although NGOs may
have slightly more influence
(6) Water supply and salmon in
California’s Central Valley
Reduced litigation costs, reduction in risk to ecosystem and
water users.
Well-connected agricultural lobby
(7) St. Croix River alewife restoration Overcome complex jurisdiction (Canada, United States, and
Indigenous People), and inconsistent management
Bass fishing lobby; Power imbalance as one jurisdiction can take
action that negatively impacts entire system
(8) Depredation by toothed whales
in French Antarctic toothfish fishery
Minimizing depredation ecological and socio-economic
impacts, avoiding toothfish quota reductions
Political will to maintain coordination and fight illegal fishing
maneuvering that obstructed solutions to the conflict or led to
failure of attempt to resolve them. Reducing litigation costs is
cited as a benefit of better governance for several cases (Moray
Firth seal management, Columbia River Basin, and California’s
Central Valley cases). While it may be clear that better governance
could increase overall benefits, win-win solutions are rare and
solutions generally require compromises.
The case studies are also informative in terms of approaches
for making tradeoffs and implementing durable solutions
(Table 5). In most cases, partnerships involving government
bodies and essential user groups were formed. The time period
between the beginning of the crisis and the formation of a
partnership with a direct mandate to address the conflict appears
to increase with the number of sectors involved in the case.
Likewise, the multiplicity of parties appears to decrease the
likelihood of reaching agreement on solutions for mitigating
the conflicts. This is illustrated by cases such as the salmon
management in the Columbia River Basin and the water supply
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TABLE 5 | Case studies – Coordination mechanisms.
Case study Coordination mechanisms
Existing mechanisms Support from authorities
(1) Moray Firth Seal Management Plan Partnership of tourism operators, conservation groups and
marine fishery interests; annual seal shooting licensing system;
local “champion” for solution mechanism.
Existing but lack of mechanism to engage fisheries, tourism
and conservation interests
(2) Salmon management institutions in
the Columbia River Basin
Northwest Power and Conservation Council, Columbia Basin
Partnership, Courts
Existing but lack of overarching institutions
(3) International Whaling Commission Collaboration on science and stewardship at the global, regional
and local levels
Still a challenge given diverging mandates and institutional
silos.
(4) Management of Natural and Reared
Salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea
Strong link between policy and science, EU fisheries policy
approaches
Existing support from managers; strong political will of
Finnish fisheries minister to improve management
(5) Interactions between seals and
commercial fishing in Ireland
Ad hoc discussion group with industry and NGOs, led by
scientists
Minimal
(6) Water supply and salmon in
California’s Central Valley
Inter-agency coordination meetings, NGO and water user
projects, Council established to facilitate stakeholder involvement,
government grants to fund alternative habitat projects
Existing, but buy-in is voluntary and decisions often
non-binding.
(7) St. Croix River alewife restoration No existing structure that allows for coordinated action Ad hoc group, facilitated by an international body, is trying
to bring all parties together
(8) Depredation by toothed whales in
French Antarctic toothfish fishery
Industry-research partnership Coordination by a regional commission (CCAMLR) and
French government
TABLE 6 | Case studies – Stakeholder objectives and processes for evaluating trade-offs.
Case study Shared views/objectives across stakeholder
groups (formally recognized)
Evaluative processes for trade-offs
(1) Moray Firth Seal Management Plan Compromise accepted and codified in collaboratively
developed Moray Firth Seal Management Plan (MFSMP)
Sophisticated trade-off analysis based on seal and salmon
population assessments and predation modeling
(2) Salmon management institutions in
the Columbia River Basin
Emerging and partial – long term aspirational goals but
lack of clear near-term objectives
Limited evaluation and lack of mechanisms for implementing
trade-offs
(3) International Whaling Commission Limited awareness of the impacts of non-whaling
threats on cetaceans
Limited but possible if open and informed public process and
shared science. Need workable and practicable solutions
(4) Management of Natural and Reared
Salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea
Common understanding but no shared view High quality Bayesian stock assessment estimates all individual
stocks separately and their reactions to policy actions
(5) Interactions between seals and
commercial fishing in Ireland
Common understanding but no shared view of
objectives
No trade-off evaluation undertaken to date
(6) Water supply and salmon in
California’s Central Valley
Water supply and ecosystem services formally
recognized as co-equal goals; but stakeholders rarely
agree on specific objectives
Strong support for “no-lose” alternatives, but mechanisms for
evaluating tradeoffs are lacking.
(7) St. Croix River alewife restoration No for some time, but consensus now emerging that
alewives should be returned to former distribution
No formal process for evaluation
(8) Depredation by toothed whales in
French Antarctic toothfish fishery
Common understanding but no shared view No trade-off evaluation undertaken to date
and salmon in California’s Central Valley where partnerships
have not yet led to broad, resolute actions needed to resolve
the long-standing conflicts. Individuals can also be the key to
conflict resolution (as well as disruption). For instance, the role
of a facilitative leader and the political will of a minister are
emphasized in the Moray Firth Seal management case and the
Baltic salmon management case, respectively.
Multiple case studies highlighted the importance, and often
the lack of, a shared views and objectives (Table 6). A common
theme across several case studies is the disagreement over the
allocation of costs and benefits across sectors. For instance, fishers
often deplore being the only sector bearing the cost of marine
mammal conservation while ocean pollution and other sectors
such as shipping may also pose threats. However, stakeholders
in favor of marine mammal conservation note that industry
sectors often fail to take into account their impacts on marine
mammals in their operating decisions. In the two US salmon
conservation cases, rebuilding salmon populations will likely
requires sacrifices by harvesters, industries and the broader public
that degrade habitat or benefits from services generated by the
hydroelectric system (e.g., irrigation, power, and flood control),
but also by conservation interests that may have to consider
trade-offs between marine mammal and birds conservation
and salmon recovery. The lack of a governance structure that
brings these disparate interests together to negotiate trade-
offs has led to litigation and political maneuvering that has
increased the cost of identifying and implementing solutions and
slowed progress.
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TABLE 7 | Case studies – Solutions implemented.
Case study Solutions implemented to address conflicts
Top-down Ostrom-type solutions Coasean solutions
(1) Moray Firth Seal
Management Plan
Government introduced legislation to force
negotiation by fisheries
Partnership of diverse stakeholder
representatives negotiating compromise,
integrating knowledge and generating
innovative solutions
Negotiation of seal shooting quotas in
areas where impacts on conservation
and tourism are minimized, and
salmon predation most likely
(2) Salmon management
institutions in the Columbia River
Basin
Court orders for recover actons; amendment of
MMPA allows lethal removal of pinnipeds
Partnership of diverse stakeholder
representatives
Leasing water rights to balance
stream flow needs for salmon and
historical water uses
(3) International Whaling
Commission
Bans on certain activities, such as in MPAs or
bans on certain gear types, shipping zones, etc.
Collaboration on monitoring and
evaluating alternatives to the activities
causing the externalities such as bubble
curtains, gear modifications, slower ships.
Compensation schemes (“beneficiary
pays” type), e.g., ECHO Program in
BC Canada
(4) Management of Natural and
Reared Salmon stocks in the
Baltic Sea
Measures based on EU Common Fisheries
Policy, supported by national restrictions
International science and policy
collaboration within existing EU
institutions
Individual Transferable Quotas (but
not currently transferable between
river-based and at-sea fisheries)
(5) Interactions between seals
and commercial fishing in Ireland
Prohibition of killing or harming seals Collective rules to mitigate impacts on
both seals and fisheries
(6) Water supply and salmon in
California’s Central Valley
Endangered species laws and administrative
biological opinions regulate water use
Collaborative governance program and
Council to facilitate stakeholder
involvement
Water markets
(7) St. Croix River alewife
restoration
Top-down legislation (blocking fish passage)
changed in response to pressure from many
groups
Emerging collaborative partnership to
overcome jurisdictional complexity.
(8) Depredation by toothed
whales in French Antarctic
toothfish fishery
TAC reduction imposed on fishery depending
on depredation level
Partnership of diverse stakeholder
representatives
Incentive scheme: quota allocation
depends on fishing firm participation
to research on whale conservation
and solutions to mitigate depredation
TABLE 8 | Case studies – Governance challenges and opportunities.
Case study Governance challenges and opportunities
Barriers to other possible solutions Opportunities
(1) Moray Firth Seal Management Plan Lack of financial support from government to maintain local
coordination and research; apathy from stakeholders as a result
Decline in salmon stocks creating renewed crisis and
elevating salmon conservation imperative
(2) Salmon management institutions in
the Columbia River Basin
Conflicting legal mandates (under ESA, MMPA, and MSA), multiple
jurisdictions (state, federal, tribal) and management agencies
Shift in norms and values may create impetus to amend the
ESA to allow consideration of trade-offs between objectives
(3) International Whaling Commission Conflicting national or treaty mandates, lack of global or regional
agreements; lack of data on population level mortality impacts of
different sectors
Collaboration, Memorandums of Understanding, joint
development of guidelines, etc.
(4) Management of Natural and Reared
Salmon stocks in the Baltic Sea
Focus of EU Common Fisheries Policy on at-sea fisheries only,
differing national policies
Potential to implement ITQs between countries and
between river-based and at-sea fisheries
(5) Interactions between seals and
commercial fishing in Ireland
Confusion of responsibilities spread between responsible parties Potential to reduce both bycatch and depredation with a
single solution, e.g., acoustic deterrents or change in fisher
behavior
(6) Water supply and salmon in
California’s Central Valley
Water scarcity; multiple agencies with jurisdictional conflicts and
different and conflicting mandate conflicts
Water scarcity and new legal mandates (groundwater
management, dam relicensing) may foster policy innovation
(7) St. Croix River alewife restoration Complex, international jurisdictions; no consensus on priority of
objectives among interested parties and ecological health of the
waterway
Increasing acceptance that return of alewife would improve
productivity and not negatively impact the recreational
fishery
(8) Depredation by toothed whales in
French Antarctic toothfish fishery
Management still focused on short-term issues, scientific
uncertainty about mitigation benefits and costs, importance of
non-use values
Longer-term management plans, test of new technical
mitigation solutions, further inclusion of fisheries impacts on
marine mammals in MSC labeling criteria
A formal evaluation of trade-offs is rarely done (the Moray
Firth case is an exception). In the Columbia River Basin salmon
case, a visioning process, where stakeholders envision a better
world (identifying objectives, and potential paths to get there),
is being employed. Even if some of the objectives are unrealistic,
a visioning process can gives stakeholders a common positive
goal to aspire to. This can help build empathy and trust, and
to build stakeholders cooperation. In addition, the visioning
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process could focus on a shared vision of the management
approach, not necessarily on a shared vision about the relative
importance of different objectives (Stephenson et al., 2019).
Sometimes developing a shared vision between industry groups
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can be less difficult
than expected as industry groups understand that they need
social acceptability (Kelly et al., 2017). In other cases, while not
sharing the same values, the different stakeholders at least have
a common understanding of the different values and objectives
of others (e.g., Baltic salmon case, seal-fisheries interactions
in Ireland, and French Antarctic toothfish fishery case). This
indicates that collaboration may be beneficial even when values
are not shared, despite the challenge of reaching agreement on a
solution remaining.
Scientific uncertainty is also mentioned as an impediment
to reaching agreement on a solution in the majority of case
studies. Stakeholders are often unwilling to incur substantial
costs for management measures that would have highly uncertain
outcomes. Even if transaction costs are equally born, some
parties perceive different odds of success. The case of Baltic
Sea salmon management underscores that probabilistic decision
analysis tools offer a possibility to check how precisely the
objectives must be known in order to be able to provide
scientific advice to a fishery. In general, scientists can estimate
and work toward decreasing uncertainties, including regarding
the value of ecosystem services, to help stakeholders identify
the potential outcomes of alternative solutions to problems.
A few of the cases discuss formal evaluations designed to
better understand the cause of the problem or the efficacy of
solutions. Sometimes, research may not be able to provide such
knowledge. Several cases note a lack of formal evaluation of
the conflict or potential solutions (e.g., seal-fisheries interactions
in Ireland, St. Croix River alewife case, French Antarctic
toothfish fishery case) or stress the issue of insufficient
funding to ensure long-term support toward collaboration
efforts in science-policy projects (e.g., Moray Firth case). Other
times, while scientific information is available, it may not
be understood and/or believed by some parties. For instance,
the linking of multiple ecological and social components in
complex models may decrease their understandability and
thereby their usefulness in supporting coordinated decision-
making across sectors. Uncertainty estimation is often technically
difficult, and the explanation of the results to all stakeholders
may be demanding.
While most of the conflicts in the case studies have yet to
be fully resolved, a variety of mechanisms to facilitate solutions
have been applied including top-down legislative and regulatory
actions; Ostrom-type solutions involving partnerships of diverse
stakeholder groups or collaborative governance; and Coasean
solutions involving compensation or market solutions (Table 7).
Top-down solutions reliant solely on regulation may not be
the most effective means of resolving many of these conflicts and
may be hindered by conflicting mandates that require changes in
legislation or international agreement and treaties. Nevertheless,
these mechanisms are often part of the solution as they can create
pressure on regulated parties to find alternative solutions that are
more effective or less costly such as in the Moray Firth case.
Most of the cases involved some attempts at collaborative
governance in the form of partnerships between stakeholder
groups. Some are facilitated by government (e.g., Columbia Basin
Partnership) while others were developed by stakeholders (e.g.,
case of seal-fisheries interactions in Ireland). Many of these
partnerships are ongoing and evolving, making it difficult to
assess their efficacy or durability.
Several case studies provided examples of Coasean bargaining
solutions, though these are mostly partial solutions that mitigate
but do not resolve the conflict. For instance, compensation
or lower docking fees may be offered to shipping vessels
reducing their speed in approaching the port, which favors whale
conservation (see IWC case study). Individual fishing quota
allocations can include a “participation in research activities”
criterion to incentivize fisheries collaboration with scientists on
issues related to marine mammal conservation (e.g., French
Antarctic toothfish fishery). Technical operating measures that
effectively mitigate externalities such as marine mammal bycatch
may be encouraged by ecolabels which can provide incentives to
industry groups seeking to demonstrate that their activities are
“eco-friendly.”
Markets can be viewed as an alternative mechanism to
collective governance based on a shared vision; in a market,
parties do not have to agree on how a resource is going to be
used. However, markets may fail to address the needs of a large
and diverse set of stakeholders, hence the need for incorporating
them in an integrated governance approach (German and Keeler,
2009). Market mechanism were used or identified as possible
solutions in several cases (water markets in two US-based
case studies, individual fishing quotas in the Baltic salmon
management case).
Barriers to solutions were identified in all cases, including
conflicting legal mandates or treaties and complex and unclear
jurisdiction over uses and activities (Table 8). Several case
studies also stress the issue of insufficient funding to ensure
long-term support toward collaboration efforts in science-policy
projects (e.g., Moray Firth case). Another common problem is the
perception that not everyone is cooperating. For instance, while
environmental NGOs are identified as relevant stakeholders
in all the case studies, they may prefer not to participate
in cross-sectoral partnerships depending on their strategy as
counter lobbyists. In the St. Croix River alewife case, the lack
of an institution with cross-national jurisdiction and the lack of
cooperation between those involved led to an aberrant situation
where the State of Maine enacted legislations to close dam
fishways to block alewife migration while Canadian authorities
were transporting alewifes around the dams using trucks. Other
recurring issues in case studies include the inertia created by
high transaction costs and the lack of existing mechanisms for
cross-sectoral cooperation.
Reconciling use and non-use values is critical to addressing
many cross-sectoral conflicts. Conflicts between use and non-
use values are illustrated in multiple case studies by the issue of
predator controls. For instance, many populations of pinnipeds
are recovering after bans on hunting, leading to conflicts between
fishers and environmental NGOs on the issue of pinniped culling.
In the case of interaction between seals and commercial fishing in
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Ireland, the legislation prevents the culling of seals. Conversely,
in the Moray Firth seal management and the Baltic salmon
management cases, fishers have been allowed to shoot a limited
number of seals. However, under EU regulations, the selling of
seal products is not allowed, which prevents the use of yield
for ethically unacceptable use. Likewise, in the United States,
the MMPA was amended in 2018 to allow for much greater
flexibility to lethally remove pinnipeds in the Columbia River
and its tributaries. Another illustration of conflicts between use
and non-use values is when a resource is valued for its role
in the ecosystem and is impacted by human activities (e.g.,
IWC internal conflict with regards to whales, St. Croix alewife
interacting with dams and bass recreational fisheries). Non-use
values may affect the scope of tradeoff possibilities when non-
use sectors are reluctant to negotiate on certain values such as
existence values or animal cruelty. Consequently, non-use values
are highly relevant to the likelihood of stakeholder collaboration.
Non-use values are highly diffuse, accruing to broad populations
not closely connected to the resource or its management. While
they may be represented by NGOs or the government, their lack
of direct involvement in conflict resolution can lead to lack of
acceptance that can undermine agreements (like in the Moray
Firth case when an animal rights group disputed the solution that
had been in place). This, in turn, may undermine other parties’
willingness to negotiate.
In some cases, a crisis may be an opportunity to facilitate
the process of getting all stakeholders together (Young et al.,
2012). In the Moray Firth case, a crisis created by a government
conservation order triggered bringing diverse stakeholders to
the table to develop a plan. Cross-jurisdictional collaboration
can be triggered by ecological disasters (Evans et al., 2014;
Villamayor-Tomas et al., 2014). However, the occurrence of
external disturbances is not always sufficient to trigger or sustain
cooperation among actors in large-scale systems (Fleischman
et al., 2014). Some actors who are involved in multiple policy
forums, sometimes referred to as “policy elites” (Jenkins-Smith
et al., 2014), may play the role of facilitative leader and bridge
different sectors. Local leaders can reach out to stakeholders
that feel left out of the process (Young et al., 2012). Otherwise,
central authorities or the courts sometimes play the role of
forcing some kind of negotiation. In some instances, central
authorities have the capacity to force parties together to negotiate
by shutting down all activities until a solution is found11. This
can make the cost of the conflict greater than the transaction
costs associated with finding a solution. However, there might be
settings where it is not acceptable politically. The two US-based
case studies (Columbia River Basin and California’s Central Valley
cases) mention the role of litigation to arbitrate conflicts between
groups or to force governments to improve their recovery
plans. In cases of very intense conflict between stakeholder
objectives, a new legislation may be needed, where policy-makers,
instead of stakeholders, decide on the weighting of the different
policy objectives.
11For example, Canada’s DFO entirely closed the Pacific groundfish trawl fishery in
1995 to force bargaining among stakeholders. The fishery reopened months later
with a new management system including 100% at-sea observer coverage and ITQs
(Grafton et al., 2004).
DISCUSSION
Feasibility and Key Determinants of
Stakeholder Collaboration
Governance frameworks generally prescribe getting all
stakeholders together and having them agree on a comprehensive
set of objectives. However, large-scale systems can involve
a multitude of governmental and non-governmental actors,
making this task very difficult. Ostrom’s work shows that
shared vision about a resource is more likely when groups
are relatively small with similar production models and
objectives (Cox et al., 2010), conditions which do not describe
most of the cross-sector problems examined in this paper.
Cross-sector collaboration efforts that address a diverse set
of policy issues entail higher transaction costs (Lubell et al.,
2019). First, the group of stakeholders needs to be defined
and bounded to avoid institutionalizing open-access (i.e.,
establishing institutions with potential for new entry would likely
fail to address typical open-access issues). Next, stakeholder
representatives need to be identified and selected to maintain
a power balance within the group. In cases involving multiple
sectors and multiple constituencies within each sector (e.g.,
large watersheds), this might not be feasible. Lubell (2004)
found that coastal watershed collaborative institutions do not
change the level of collaboration among conflicting stakeholders.
Advocacy actors such as environmental and economic interest
groups often have conflicting policy preferences (Newig and
Fritsch, 2009). Some stakeholders also may lobby for their
narrow policy interests rather than have a more neutral
perspective. Other potential issues include the strategy of
some powerful environmental NGOs that may get involved in
conflicts with a disruptive campaign but refuse to participate in
collective policy forums (Redpath et al., 2013). Greater public
involvement in participatory environmental planning can also
help include public values into decision-making and improve
trust in government agencies, though this will depend on the
commitment of the lead agency to the participatory process
(Beierle and Konisky, 2000). An appropriate legal framework
is also important to facilitate stakeholder collaboration12.
Consequently, the number of challenges in gaining stakeholder
cooperation and collaboration are not to be underestimated.
Trust and learning among resource use sectors is critical for
establishing durable management regimes and fostering system
resilience. Support from central authorities is also essential.
Resilience of the system and durability across political cycles
require that institutions, government bodies, stakeholders, and
resources have the potential to adapt to change (Folke, 2006).
According to Ostrom (1998), three main elements are important
in designing long-term solutions to collective action when
multiple parties bring different interests: reciprocity (continually
interacting institutional players may be more willing to trade),
reputation, and long-term trust. In general, a proactive approach
is usually a much better strategy than a reactive approach to
develop all three of these elements. Legislation can support a
12For instance, under the US Endangered Species Act, NGOs can sue without
having to negotiate beforehand.
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more proactive approach to avoid crisis. The role played by
central authorities in monitoring and enforcement may also be
essential to build trust in the system (Singleton, 2000; Potoski and
Prakash, 2004), especially in cases where there is no history of
cooperation between sectors.
The question of who initiates coordinated management
efforts, and at what level, is also important. Cross-sectoral
collaboration can be a local effort or it can also be widespread.
Who sets objectives can greatly influence the success of
collaborative governance. The emergence of a widely respected
leader to guide the process can be favorable to build trust
among groups (Stern and Coleman, 2015; Young et al., 2016).
The importance of a leader was noted in the Moray Firth
case, but the role individuals play in finding or disrupting
solutions is rarely documented though it may often be
critical. Moreover, while evaluation of tradeoffs is necessary, a
mechanism for deciding resource uses and making associated
tradeoffs is also needed. The identification of mechanisms
for making tradeoffs across sectors is a critical challenge for
facilitating solutions. In addition, the cumulative effects of
management actions are typically not evaluated. Cumulative
effects are often inherent to cross-sectoral conflicts, and to
some extent, the evaluation of the cumulative effects is
the ultimate goal of cross-sectoral collaboration (Korpinen
and Andersen, 2016; Stephenson et al., 2019). Finally, the
level of complexity and the information needed, which
increases with the number of sectors considered, is an
important issue. In some cases, it may be more effective to
solve conflicts among a subset of stakeholder groups rather
than considering all sectors at once and being unable to
resolve tradeoffs.
Debate Over Compensation and
Incentive Schemes
Distributional impacts of institutional change are often the
primary reason for the difficulty of resolving cross-sectoral
conflicts. Some parties anticipate bearing more, uncompensated
costs than benefits, and they have an incentive to resist. For
instance, if the ecosystem service is a broad public good, but
the costs are narrowly imposed, then parties are likely to
oppose institutional change. Ostrom (1990) and Libecap (1994)
identified that a proportionate distribution of costs and benefits
are key to resolving conflicts. Ideally, the distribution of costs
and benefits should be fair. However, not everybody will agree on
what constitutes a fair distribution (Loomis and Ditton, 1993).
In a practical way, what is important is to achieve a distribution
of costs and benefits so that no group will defect; to this end,
the distribution of costs and benefits should relate directly to the
shared set of objectives and values. There are two main aspects
to the distribution of costs and benefits: (1) the distribution once
the long-term objective is met, and (2) the distribution during
the transition phase (moving from status quo to a solution).
Political systems, where short-term outcomes are prioritized, can
be ill-equipped to meet long term objectives if stakeholders are
incentivized to focus on the short term costs of transitioning.
Compensation might help address issues related to redistribution
that may occur in the transition phase.
Compensation and incentive schemes can be a solution to help
achieve environmental objectives but may also be controversial
depending on the context. In a number of countries, livestock
owners are compensated for their losses due to attacks by
protected wolves (Agarwala et al., 2010; Thiel et al., 2012).
This mechanism intends to help achieve conservation objectives.
However, in most fisheries (including many fisheries where
depredation occurs), fishers are given the right to extract a
common-pool resource for free. If fishers are also given the right
to harm another public resource (e.g., marine mammals that
might interfere with fishing operations) or paid as a result of
depredation costs, then the public may perceive this as unfair.
Depredation could be seen as a “cost of doing business” that
fishers should bear just as they would bear any other privately
incurred cost to harvest a valuable resource. On the other hand,
this type of compensation is not very different from cases where
successful parties in the regulatory game get benefits that they do
not pay for (e.g., subsidies).
The reluctance of many to go toward market-based
approaches is that incentives in some market-based fishery
systems have been perceived as perverse: public resources
were given for free to groups in the form of shares, which are
now worth millions of dollars, which is seen as unfair from
society’s point of view (Bromley, 2009). Another potential issue
in fisheries where rights are well defined and transferable is
that the willingness to pay of recreational fishers can be higher
than that of commercial fishers, and there may be cases where
recreational fishers would buy out the commercial fishers (see
above discussion on ITQs in the Baltic Sea salmon case). But this
has not been widely allowed because it is not politically or socially
acceptable to have commercial fishing disappear. The need for
market instruments depends on whether social and cultural
norms foster cooperation and allow for reallocations across
different parties (Noussair and Tucker, 2005). Market-based
approaches may be unnecessary in situations where cultural and
social rules are effective in resolving cross-sectoral externalities
(Shogren, 2012). In other words, good social capital may help to
find acceptable solutions.
Additionally, there might be concerns about moral hazard
as compensation might lead to changes in behavior of resource
harvesters. If harvesters are required to bear the cost of
depredation, rather than being compensated, they may devise
strategies to avoid depredation events (e.g., by changing when
and where they fish or with gear modifications or devices
to deter or scare away predators). This also raises questions
about how to organize the regulation and enforcement of the
compensation system to deter cheating. For instance, in the case
of depredation by seals, it may be difficult to demonstrate that
a fish has been damaged by a seal. Society may be reluctant to
offer compensation for damaged fish, even if the cost is relatively
small. Yet, one could argue that fishers already get a lot of
things that they do not pay for and compensation might be a
relatively cheap option to solve a long standing problem. With
regard to moral hazard, ex-ante compensation (e.g., payments
for ecosystem services) may be more appropriate than ex-post
compensation (e.g., fixed value per damaged fish) in order to
maintain incentives for harvesters to prevent depredation events
(Skonhoft, 2017).
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Compensation means that rights requiring compensation have
to be allocated and often these rights would be granted for free
to past participants (grandfathering), which is part of why this
might not be politically acceptable. This relates to the question
of fairness and equity. The lesson from Coase (1960) is that if
transaction costs are high, then the initial distribution of rights
matters and this might affect whether you would want to have a
compensation scheme or not in some cases. Moreover, in cases
where resource exploitation generates negative externalities to
a non-use sector, the issue of whether non-use values can be
quantified is critical (Krutilla, 1967). The ability to estimate these
non-use values13 in a manner that allows a negotiation is a key
factor in achieving agreement. If we cannot adequately estimate
non-use values, then they may be viewed as trumping other
values and may undermine collective action. They may also be
implicitly assigned a value of zero, which would likely lead to
socially inefficient outcomes.
Stakeholder adaptation to an external shock (resilience) and
willingness to make a major change, depend on the different
perceptions of the probability of an external shock and how
the distribution of costs and benefits are perceived. Discount
rates that people are using are important for long-term risk
assessments. Discount rates and access to capital, as well as
the implications of prospect theory on the redistribution of
interests (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), are relevant when a
change is needed and involves costly actions for stakeholders.
Compensation could take the form of low-cost financing (e.g.,
loans) to give users the opportunity to make a major change,
which might be more politically acceptable than compensation
(Rangeley and Davies, 2012).
Looking Ahead
The accelerating trend of increased ocean uses over the last
50 years is intensifying anthropogenic pressure on ocean
ecosystems (Jouffray et al., 2020). The multitude of claims
on ocean food, material, and space, increasingly leads to
cross-sectoral conflicts such as those examined in this paper.
Addressing the challenges associated with cross-sectoral conflicts
requires an improved knowledge of the diversity and magnitude
of claims being made and their interactions, as well as a
greater consideration of trade-offs and cumulative impacts
(Stephenson et al., 2019; Jouffray et al., 2020). In addition,
traditional governance is often not well-adapted to mitigate
these conflicts (Spijkers et al., 2018, 2019), stressing the need to
consider Ostrom-type approaches and Coasean solutions more
systematically to achieve a balance between sustainable use and
conservation while addressing equity concerns. More research is
therefore required to determine where and when each of these
governance alternatives is most appropriate to manage conflicts.
An additional complication for ocean governance is that
64% of the surface of the oceans is situated beyond national
jurisdictions, where human activities are regulated and managed
by a multitude of disparate sectoral institutions (Wright
et al., 2018), and these institutions have limited authority and
enforcement capability. In particular, there is little cooperation
13Tools to estimate non-use values include revealed-preference (Boyle, 2017) and
stated-preference methods (Johnston et al., 2017).
between existing organizations and no responsibility for
overarching principles for the conservation and sustainable use
of biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction. To address growing
threats to biodiversity in these areas, the United Nations (UN)
is currently discussing a possible international legally binding
instrument to conserve biodiversity and mediate between
conflicting uses (Wright et al., 2019). Interestingly, ongoing
discussions include the possibility of a funding mechanism to
balance the distribution of costs and benefits, in particular
between countries of lower and higher capacity (Österblom et al.,
2020). Such a funding mechanism could for instance include
side payments to a conservation fund (to support environmental
sustainability) or to a capacity-building fund (to provide financial
resources for operationalizing a clearing-house mechanism or
help developing countries).
Coastal and marine governance conflicts are also relevant to
UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and associated
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). As pointed out by Singh
et al. (2018), SDG 14 (Life under Water) that aims to “conserve
and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for
sustainable development” contributes to many other SDGs such
as ending poverty (SDG 1), ending hunger (SDG 2), good
health and well-being (SDG 3), reduced inequalities (SDG 10),
and peace, justice, and strong institutions (SDG 16). A failure
to develop institutions able to mitigate marine and coastal
governance conflicts may therefore undermine the realization
of these broader goals. Acknowledging the critical role of the
ocean in achieving the SDGs, the UN has proclaimed a Decade
of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development (2021–2030) to
encourage the development of the frameworks and tools required
for the integrated and sustainable management of the ocean
(Ryabinin et al., 2019; Claudet et al., 2020; Pendleton et al.,
2020). Given the need to address cross-sectoral conflicts for
achieving societal goals, it appears important that the Decade
of Ocean Science engages in additional social science research
to support the development of more integrated, multi-sectoral
governance approaches.
CONCLUSION
The successful management of cross-sectoral conflicts often
requires moving beyond traditional top-down regulation.
Ostrom-type approaches, which are broadly focused on
cooperative management and collective-choice rules, and
Coasean bargaining, which involves exchanges of some
form of property rights or regulatory benefits between
groups, both delegate more responsibilities to stakeholders
who have more practical knowledge than managers or
politicians to implement actions. Both approaches may
be more responsive to dynamic factors and thus may
provide more durable institutions. Ultimately, which policy
option is more appropriate depends on the nature of the
resources, the users and their values, and the nature of
their interactions. Often some combination of top-down
pressure, collaborative governance, and bargaining and
exchange may be needed to resolve these highly complex
and intractable conflicts.
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More research is required to put forward governance
alternatives that will assist in evaluating trade-offs and conflict
management. Addressing marine and coastal governance
conflicts at the interface of multiple sectors and jurisdictions
could be approached through the effective combination
of collaborative institutions and mechanisms that provide
incentives to stakeholders, or compensation to parties that
perceive that they are going to be made worse off by institutional
change. Solutions need to ensure that non-use values are
reflected in decisions, most likely through public participation
in collaborative institutions if representativeness can be
guaranteed. Finally and ultimately, cross-sectoral coordination
for conservation is highly dependent on long-term stakeholder
and political commitments.
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